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A MODEL OF ABSTRACT COOPERATION IN
GAMES OF UNCERTAINTY
Hillel Bavli*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Sir Ronald Fisher remarked that it was "Darwin's chief contribution, not only to Biology but to the whole of natural science, to
have brought to light a process by which contingencies a priori improbable, are given, in the process of time, an increasing
probability, until it is their non-occurrence rather than their occurrence which becomes highly improbable." 1 The idea that evolutionary processes naturally propel a state of affairs toward a higher,
perhaps more complex or advanced, state of affairs is one that may
extend to any context characterized by a dynamic time frame, including oligopoly models of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
I argue that, contrary to the popular assertion that coordinated
pricing necessarily requires voluntary coordination,2 oligopoly markets may evolve to a state of cooperation-one of collective profit
maximization-absent a conscious state of coordination among the
players, or even knowledge of such cooperation.
Professor Donald Turner, in his seminal treatise on the definition
of "agreement" under the Sherman Act, touches upon the idea
that oligopoly may naturally precipitate parallel non-competitive
pricing that may reasonably be considered individual conduct, but
stops short of asserting that cooperative equilibria may result without any form of conscious commitment to coordinate prices. Turner argues that oligopoly markets are defined by their
interdependent nature and that each player will rationally and naturally calculate the consequences of its price decisions with regard
to the expected reactions of its competitors. 4 This explanation
does not go far enough.
* J.D. candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. Special thanks to
my family and friends for their support, and to Professor Barry Hawk for his guidance
and advice.
1. Bert James Lowenberg, Darwin Scholarship of the Darwin Year, 11 AM. Q.
526, 528 (Winter 1959) (quoting JULIAN HUXLEY, ET AL., EDS., EVOLUTION AS A PROCESS 91 (1954)).

2. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
3. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 655 (1962).

4. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
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While it is true that cooperation is a natural consequence of the
interdependent nature of oligopoly markets, it is not necessarily a
result of conduct based on conscious regard of future reaction by
competitors. While Turner proposes a theory of cooperation based
on forward-looking consideration of future reaction, and similarly,
George Stigler presents a theory of cooperation based on fear of
detection and retaliation, 5 I propose a theory of evolution to cooperation based on the progression of consequences from previous
actions.
Specifically, George Stigler "reasoned that 'oligopolists wish to
collude to maximize joint profits' but 'if any member of any agreement can secretly violate it, he will gain larger profits than by conforming to it,' so a model of oligopoly should focus on the 'problem
of policing a collusive agreement."' 6
Many economic and legal models determine a firm's ability to
detect cheating by analyzing the quality and quantity of information exchanged among firms.' For example, industry trade associations are often accused of existing for the sole purpose of
facilitating tacit collusion. Stigler's model goes a step further: it
allows participants in a collusive arrangement to infer that a rival is
secretly cutting prices, and defecting from the arrangement, if they
unexpectedly lose many old customers or unexpectedly gain few
new customers.8
This paper extends Stigler's model from a theory of tacit interaction and sustained collusion based on a player's ability to detect
other players' defections to a theory of independent action based
on a player's natural tendency to implement payoff-maximizing
strategies by comparing previous performance to current performance and adjusting conduct accordingly. I propose that neither
conscious coordination nor information exchange is necessary to
achieve cooperative equilibria. Rather, an evolutionary process
that parallels Darwinian biological evolution propels economic
markets toward states of cooperative equilibrium.

5. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
6. Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 728 (2004) (quoting George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964)).
7. See STIGLER, supra note 6.
8. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 728.
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WHEN COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES CLASH:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Imagine a situation in which a troublemaker is asked to report to
the high school principal's office for investigation of his involvement in a prank. Earlier that morning, the student, Jim, along with
one other student, John, released a chicken into the men's restroom. The principal sat the students in separate rooms and spoke
to each individually. He informed Jim of the following: Jim, as well
as John, was being investigated for pulling a prank earlier that
morning, in which he had released a chicken in the men's restroom.
Jim had been seen with John entering the men's bathroom during
first period classes holding a large brown sack. Neither Jim nor
John had followed school protocol, which required that they report
to the school office to get a hall pass anytime they left class for any
reason, even to use the restroom. For this infringement, the principal had authority to suspend the students for one month. For releasing the chicken in the restroom, the principal had authority to
suspend them for eighteen months. The principal, however, lacked
sufficient evidence to condemn Jim or John as the culprits of the
chicken prank.
The principal asked that Jim testify regarding John's involvement in the prank. Jim's testimony would provide enough evidence to allow the principal to suspend John for 18 months, and in
return, Jim would receive no punishment at all. If, however, John
also testified against Jim, each student would be condemned to a
twelve-month suspension (their respective eighteen-month suspensions would be downgraded to twelve-month suspensions as reward for their testimonies). If Jim refused to testify but John
testified against Jim, Jim would receive an eighteen-month suspension and John would receive no punishment. Finally, if neither of
the students testified against the other, the principal would have
sufficient evidence only to suspend each of them for one month for
failing to obtain a hall pass, but he would lack evidence to suspend
them as the chicken prank culprits.
The foregoing example illustrates a well-known and much analyzed phenomenon dubbed the "Prisoner's Dilemma."9 The Prisoner's Dilemma occurs when individual incentives and collective
incentives clash. Assuming that Jim wished only to minimize the
9. Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher invented the Prisoner's Dilemma game
around 1950, and A. W. Tucker formalized the game shortly thereafter. ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

216 n.2 (1984).
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severity of his own punishment, 10 and was indifferent to the severity of John's punishment, his optimal strategy was to testify against
John regardless of whether he believed John would testify against
him.1 If John testified, Jim's optimal decision was to testify since a
twelve-month suspension is less severe than an eighteen-month
suspension. If John refused to testify, Jim's optimal decision was to
testify anyway, since no punishment at all is less severe than a onemonth suspension, and since Jim was indifferent to the severity of
John's punishment.
Thus, the dilemma is clear: Jim and John, each strategizing individually and in their respective self-interests, would testify against
each other and consequently each receive a twelve-month suspension. Had they, however, each strategized to minimize the aggregate severity of their respective punishments-had they
"cooperated"-each refusing to testify against the other, they
would have achieved the optimal collective outcome, a mere onemonth suspension each.
The Prisoner's Dilemma is "common in everything from personal relations to international relations."' 2 It applies to interactions between bacteria, individuals, nations, and corporations 13 and
is the foundation of "many of the best-developed models of important political, social, and economic processes."' 4 Oligopoly markets are characterized by interdependence among market suppliers
("firms"): each firm's profits are products of the decisions made by
other firms in the market. Oligopoly market structures thus embody the elements of the Prisoner's Dilemma and are among the
most examined of such contexts.' 5
Firms can maximize industry profits by behaving like a single
monopolist and then dividing the profits among themselves.' 6 The
problem is that each firm has the temptation to cheat;17 each firm
individually maximizes its profit in any round of decision-making
by expanding its output beyond the agreed-upon level (or, alterna10. Severity is presumably in proportion to length of suspension.
11. Remember, Jim and John are seated in separate rooms and are presumed unable to communicate.
12. AXELROD, supra note 9, at 27.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Id.
15. An oligopoly defines an economic market with few competitors such that production decisions affect the product's price. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMIcs: A MODERN APPROACH 468 (5th ed. 1999).
16. Id. at 483-84.
17. Id. at 484.
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tively, by decreasing its price below the agreed-upon monopoly
price).
Thus, once again, a dilemma unfolds: each firm, acting in its individual self-interest, chooses to overproduce (or underprice). 8 A
competitive, profit-minimizing price emerges. Had the firms cooperated by foregoing the opportunity to overproduce (or undercut
the others' prices), a monopolistic, profit-maximizing price would
have surfaced.
The situations, or "games," described above are such that "players" each simultaneously make a single decision. Absent a mechanism of enforcing cooperation, the Prisoner's Dilemma holds true
and the players forego the collectively optimal outcome. No player
has reason to trust that the others will forego acting for the individual good for the sake of the collective good. A different outcome
results, however, if the game is played repeatedly by the same
players. 19
"Repeated play allows players to respond to each other's actions, and so each player must consider the reactions of his opponents in making his decision. 20° Repeated play provides a critical
enforcement mechanism: If a player cheats, or "defects" from a
collusive arrangement in one period, the other players can "punish" him by defecting in future periods. 21 "In a repeated game,
each player has the opportunity to establish a reputation for coop'
eration, and thereby encourage the other player to do the same. "22
The presumption, of course, is that players have the ability to detect when other players are cheating. Therefore, models of cooperation often focus on players' ability to detect defection.
I.

GAME THEORY:

A

CONCISE REVIEW

23
Game theory is a "collection of tools for predicting outcomes
for a group of interacting agents, where an action of a single agent
directly affects the payoffs (welfare or profits) of other participat-

18. A Cournot Model describes firms as choosing their quantities and allowing the
market to determine the price. A Bertrand Model describes firms as setting their
prices and allowing the market to determine the quantity sold. Id. at 482.
19. Id. at 498.
20. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with
Discounting and with Incomplete Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA 533, 533 (1986).
21. VARIAN, supra note 15, at 498.
22. Id.

23. "Outcomes" refer to a list of actions adopted by each participant. Oz SHY,
11-12 (1995).

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
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ing agents. ' 24 Game theory is particularly useful in situations
where the number of players is small and the decisions of each
player significantly affect the payoff of other players.2 5 Thus, oligopoly markets, by reason of their interdependent nature, are ripe
for game-theoretic analysis. 6
A.

Normal Form Games

A normal form game is one in which each player must make
decisions without knowing what the other is doing.27 Alternatively
stated, each player moves simultaneously. 28 Consider the example
described above, in which two high school students must choose,
simultaneously and without knowing what the other will choose,
whether to testify against the other. 29 In this example, there are
four possible outcomes: 30 (Testify, Testify), (Testify, Don't Testify),
(Don't Testify, Testify), (Don't Testify, Don't Testify). The various
outcomes and respective payoffs are conveniently and conventionally displayed in matrix form.
JOHN:

Don't Testify

Testify
Testify

-12

Don't Testify

-18

JIM:

-12
0

0

-18

-1

-1

The above table is a bimatrix31 that describes each set of outcomes as well as the resulting payoffs that each player receives. By
convention, the first payoff in each cell is that of the row player;
the second payoff is that of the column player. 2 In this example,
there is a "dominant strategy," one optimal strategy choice for
each player regardless of the decision made by the other player.33
Each player is best off choosing to testify, regardless of whether
the other player testifies. The game's equilibrium, therefore, is the
dominant strategy outcome (Testify, Testify). 4
24. Id. at 11.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6 (1994).
28. SHY, supra note 23, at 12.
29. See id. at 6-9.
30. Remember, an "outcome" means a set of actions adopted by each player.
31. A bimatrix is a matrix in which each cell has two numbers. BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 10.
32. Id.
33. VARIAN, supra note 15, at 493.
34. Not every game contains dominant strategy equilibria. Id. at 494.
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A pair of strategies is said to be a "Nash Equilibrium" if each
player's choice is optimal, given the other player's choice.35 More
formally, an outcome d = (d1, d,.. ., d') (where d' E A' for every i =
1, 2, .. ., N) is a Nash Equilibrium if no player would find it benefi-

cial to deviate, provided that all other players do not deviate from
their strategies played at the Nash outcome. 36 For every player i,i
=1, 2,...N,
n/(a', d -.) for every

i(a i, d')

ai E

A

i7
0

where rJ represents player i's payoff (welfare or profits). It should
be noted that a dominant action equilibrium is also a Nash Equilibrium,38 and further, that there can be multiple Nash Equilibria or
no Nash Equilibria at all.39
B.

Repeated Games
Up to this point, I have discussed one-shot games, i.e., games
that consist of one period in which both players simultaneously
choose their actions. Repeated games are simply one-shot games
that are identically repeated.40 As mentioned above, where cooperative equilibrium may fail in a one-shot game, it may emerge in a
repeated game.4 1 In the repeated game, as in the one-shot game,
each player acts simultaneously during each round of play.42 In the
repeated game, however, it is assumed that all players can observe
and monitor their own actions as well as those of all other players
in all previous rounds. That is to say, they remember perfectly the
43
game's "history."
A game can be one of finite or infinite repetitions." A finitely
repeated game is one in which the number of periods, or rounds of
play, is fixed.45 An infinitely repeated game repeats indefinitely. 46
While the distinction may at first seem insignificant, particularly in
games with many, yet finite, repetitions, it is often a critical factor
in determining a game's outcome. Specifically, "backward induc35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
SHY, supra note 23, at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
See VARIAN, supra note 15, at 498.
Id. at 498-99.
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tion," a technique used to determine a game's equilibrium outcomes by seeking the Nash Equilibrium in the final round and
working backwards to solve the Nash Equilibrium in each preceding round, is inapplicable to infinitely repeated games, since there
is no final period.47 The repeated prisoner's dilemma is the classic
example: in games of fixed finite "horizon," or periods of play, the
only equilibrium is one of both players defecting in every period,
whereas a cooperative equilibrium is sustainable in games of infinite horizon.48
Whether an infinitely repeated game results in cooperative equi49
librium depends, in part, on the players' "time discount factor.
The time discount factor represents a player's valuation of future
payoffs relative to current payoffs. Specifically, the time discount
factor is "the amount by which the value of a payoff in the next
period. 50
period must be adjusted to reflect its value in the present
Assuming that defecting from cooperation in one period will trigger punishment in future periods, cooperation is easier to sustain
when players have higher time discount factors, since the threat of
punishment in future rounds is stronger.51
The Folk Theorem, Player Strategies, and Nash Equilibria
Repeated games allow for outcomes that would not occur in
52
one-shot games because players fear retaliation. The "Folk Theo53 It states that "any individually
rem" expresses this phenomenon.
rational outcome can arise as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely re'5 4 The equilibria
peated games with sufficiently little discounting.
of an infinitely repeated game can, for example, be infinitely many
sets of quantities between the "Cournot-Nash equilibrium" quantities-that is, the set of quantities such that each competitor is satis55
fied with its quantity given its rivals' quantities -and the jointly
56
payoff-maximizing quantities. Game theory says little, however,
C.

47. SHY, supra note 23, at 30.
48. FUDENBERG & MASKIN, supra note 20, at 534. Still, there is evidence that
suggests cooperation in games with a large yet finite number of repetitions. Id. at
534-35 (providing a possible explanation of such results).
49. SHY, supra note 23, at 33.
50. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 27, at 168.
51. See SHY, supra note 23, at 31-33.
52. FUDENBERG & MASKING, supra note 20, at 533.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 722.
56. Id. at 731.
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about which equilibrium should result or how equilibrium is
achieved.57
Economic literature has spawned a multitude of models exploring such questions.58 Few economists dispute that retaliatory
threat plays a significant role in attaining and maintaining cooperative equilibrium.5 9 Economists have long sought after the most efficacious punishment strategies. 60 In quantity-setting games, it has
been shown that the most effective enforcement scheme is to punish a defecting player as much as possible for one and only one
period of the game.61
Another much-explored area concerns the ability of a player to
detect defection. After all, effective enforcement of defection first
requires its detection. The issue of uncertainty concerning other
players' actions is thus an important strain of equilibrium analy6z
sis.
For example, if a player can only observe the market price,
should the player interpret a price decline as another player's defection meriting punishment, or simply a decline in consumer demand? 63 It has been shown that if the market price falls
sufficiently a player's optimal strategy is to infer defection, and
therefore impose punishment.64 Such models result in random
price wars, since random fluctuations in demand may cause erroneous inferences of defection.65
Strategies in which defection triggers a retaliatory response have
proved useful in the evolution of cooperation. 66 Indeed, the Titfor-Tat strategy, a simple "policy of cooperating on the first move
and then doing whatever the other player did on the previous
57. Id. at 731-32.
58. Id. at 732.
59. See Edward H. Chamberlin, Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are Few, 44 Q.J.
ECON. 63, 85 (1929); Stigler, supra note 6, at 44.
60. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 733.
61. Id. (citing Dilip Abreu, On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting, 56 ECONOMETRICA 383, 384-86 (1988)); Dilip Abreu, Extremal Equilibriaof
Oligopolistic Supergames, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 191 (1986); CARL SHAPIRO, THEORIES
OF OLIGOPOLY BEHAVIOR, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 329, 366-70 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 301-04 (2d ed. 2002)).
62. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 733.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion
under Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 89-94 (1984); Robert H.
Porter, Optimal Cartel Trigger Price Strategies, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 313 (1983)).
65. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 733.
66. Id.
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move,"67 won numerous computer-run repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game tournaments in which many different strategies were
matched against one another.68

IV.

TACIT COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST LAW

Tacit collusion, in the context of antitrust law, refers to the phenomenon whereby "competing sellers might be able to coordinate
their pricing without conspiring in the usual sense of the term-69
that is, without any overt or detectable acts of communication.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade." 70 These terms embrace
the single concept of agreement. 71 "Section 1 reaches every ara
rangement in which multiple parties have a 'unity of purpose or
72
common design and understanding or a meeting of minds' every 'conscious commitment to a common scheme.'
Illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman Act is generally predicated upon the existence of an agreement. 74 But what exactly constitutes an agreement is a problem that has recurrently plagued
75
antitrust law, and one to which the current analysis speaks.
"73

A.

The Case against Condemnation of Tacit Collusion as a
Section 1 Violation: The Interdependence
Theory of Pricing

Professor Donald Turner argues that "oligopoly price behavior, '' 76 or "conscious parallelism, '' 77 can be expressed "as individual
behavior-rational individual decision in the light of relevant economic facts"-rather than behavior based upon agreement. 78 "We
could say that each seller has simply decided individually, perhaps
after bitter experience, that it is more profitable not to indulge in
67. AXELROD, supra note 9, at 13.
68. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 733-34.
69. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 52-53 (2d ed. 2001).

70. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
71. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 734 (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I[ 1400a, at 1 (2d ed. 2003)).
72. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 734 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)).
73. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 734 (citing E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n
v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914)).
74. TURNER, supra note 3, at 655.
75. Id.

76. Id. at 666.
77. Id. at 663.
78. Id. at 666.
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price competition under any but the most pressing circumstances,
appealing as price cutting might appear to be from a less experienced viewpoint."7 9
Turner illustrates his point with the "salient facts" in American
Tobacco Co. v. United States.8 ° Three large cigarette companies,
who together accounted for 90% of all cigarette sales, charged
identical prices from 1928 to 1940, changing prices only seven times
in that period. 81 Such price changes would be made by one company, to be followed almost immediately by the others, who would
not sell further to dealers until their price changes were effected.82
Despite a general economic depression and declining costs, the
three companies substantially raised their prices and thereby significantly increased profits. 83 Turner explains that such pricing behavior, "in the face of declining costs and weakening demand," is
incontrovertibly "noncompetitive. ' '84 But no "economist worthy of
the name" would conclude on the basis of these facts alone that
such behavior is a result of an actual price agreement.8 Rather, as
economic theory suggests, the behavior is a natural result of an oligopoly market, in which parallel action may arise "without overt
communication or agreement, but solely through a rational calculation by each seller of what the consequences of his price decision
would be, taking into account the probable or virtually certain reactions of his competitors." 86 Alternatively stated, rational behavior, even independently rational behavior, militates against
defection from the cooperative equilibrium, since any defection
will, with virtual certainty, be met with retaliatory defections.
Oligopolists base pricing decisions in part on anticipated reactions
to such decisions; they are "interdependent" with respect to their
87
pricing.
Turner concludes that prohibiting companies from taking into
account the probable reactions to their pricing decisions, forcing
companies to ignore the interdependent nature of oligopolistic
markets, would "demand such irrational behavior that full compli79. Id.

80. TURNER, supra note 3, at 661.
81. Id.; see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805-08 (1946).
82. Turner, supra note 3, at 661.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

87.

POSNER,

supra note 69, at 56.
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ance would be virtually impossible. ' 88 Further, Turner argues that
when real-world complications are present, the emergence of "a
pattern of noncompetitive pricing.., requires something
which we
89
could, not unreasonably, call a 'meeting of minds.'
B.

The Case for Condemnation of Tacit Collusion as a
Section 1 Violation

The requirement of agreement, according to Judge Richard Posner, does not exclude the possibility of a tacit agreement, and to
confine the Sherman Act to cases involving explicit communication
between parties is uneconomical and ill-aligned with the purposes
of the Act. 90
Posner argues that "there is no distortion of accepted meanings
in viewing tacit collusion as a form of concerted rather than unilateral activity." 91 Courts do not distinguish between essentially linguistic forms of communication. 92 "A knowing wink can mean
more than words. ' 93 To say that rivals may communicate by observing each others' marketplace actions does not greatly stretch
the meaning of communication. 94 Posner argues that "[i]f seller A
restricts his output in the expectation that B will do likewise, and B
restricts his output in a like expectation, there is a literal meeting of
the minds-a mutual understanding-even if there is no overt
communication. ' 95 Posner asserts that such meeting of the minds
constitutes an agreement within the meaning of the Sherman Act.9 6
Posner finds fault with courts' focus on conspiracy doctrine
rather than on price theory. While the relevance of economic evidence to establishing price fixing plays an increasingly important
role in courts, most courts hold that such evidence should be used
only to help the trier of fact infer the existence of an overt agreement, and that such inference of conspiracy is indispensable to
88.

supra note 3, at 669.
supra note 6, at 772 (quoting TURNER, supra note 3, at 664).
90. POSNER, supra note 69, at 94.
91. Id. Turner and Posner are in agreement on this point. Turner does not brand
tacit collusion as necessarily individual, rather than concerted, action. He maintains
merely that neither point of view is unreasonable. He claims that oligopoly pricing
behavior may be described as individual behavior "as well as it can be described as
'agreement."' TURNER, supra note 3, at 666.
92. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 735.
93. Id. (quoting Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965)).
94. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 735 (emphasis added).
95. POSNER, supra note 69, at 94.
96. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1996).
TURNER,
89. WERDEN,
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finding a Sherman Act violation.97 The problem is that not all
price fixing activities actually cause a significant increase in price or
reduction in output, and perhaps more serious, overt communication is not always necessary to significantly raise prices to collusive
levels. 98 The law is thus at once under-inclusive and over-inclusive
with respect to the Sherman Act's goals of pursuing economic
efficiency.
Furthermore, Posner regards tacit collusion as the most harmful
of all oligopoly conduct. 99 Exclusion of tacit collusion from the
Sherman Act's ambit is paradoxical in that it fails to proscribe collusion where proscription is most necessary: in markets that are
highly propitious to collusive equilibria. 1°° It is situations in which
collusion may be accomplished via market actions, rather than
those which require overt communication, in which collusion will
be most maintainable and probably most harmful.' 0 '
Posner proposes that oligopoly behavior be studied "in terms of
the theory of cartels."'0 " According to this view, oligopoly is necessary but not sufficient for successful price fixing.' 3 Posner argues
that coordinated pricing "is not an unconscious state."' °4 Rather,
"voluntary actions by the sellers are necessary to translate the bare
condition of an oligopoly market into a situation of noncompetitive
express or
pricing. "105 Accordingly, such voluntary action, whether
10 6
tacit, falls within Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
C.

Information Exchange and the Role it Plays in Maintaining
Collusive Equilibria

George Stigler sought to reconcile the hypothesis that oligopolists wish to collude to maximize joint profits "with facts, such as
that collusion is impossible for many firms and collusion is much
97. POSNER, supra note 69, at 93-94.
98. Id. at 53.
99. Id. at 55. See also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct under
the Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 31 (2004).
100. Id. (citing David L. Meyer, The Seventh Circuit's High Fructose Corn Syrup
Decision-Sweetfor Plaintiffs, Sticky for Defendants, ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 67, 71).
101. Id. at 30-31.
102. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 774 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the
Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1569-75 (1969)).
103. Michael K. Vaska, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the
Boundary, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 508, 514 (1985).
104. POSNER, supra note 69, at 97.
105. VASKA, supra note 103, at 514 (quoting POSNER, supra note 104, at 1575).
106. VASKA, supra note 103, at 514.
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more effective in some circumstances than in others. ' 10 7 Stigler argues: "The reconciliation is found in the problem of policing a colwhich proves to be a problem in the theory of
lusive agreement,
1 08
information.'
Antitrust law has developed a price-fixing rule that prosecutes
and punishes "actual" agreements to fix price.' 0 9 Market players,
therefore, may take all the necessary steps to coordinate their pricing but stop short of any actual "agreement.' 10 The most important of such steps is "the exchange of information as to what prices
each seller is charging, or charged in the recent past, or intends to
charge in the future.""' Posner asserts that information-exchanges
"foster collusive pricing both by enabling convergence on a single
supracompetitive price and by facilitating detection of, and thereby
discouraging, sales below that price. "112
Thus, information exchange relates to collusive pricing as follows: As mentioned above, threat of retaliation holds collusion in
tact. A credible threat requires the ability to enforce the collusive
arrangement by punishing defection. Enforcement, in turn, requires detection of defections. Finally, as asserted by Stigler and
Posner, information exchange is the mechanism by which detection
is facilitated.
The problem is that unlike collusive pricing itself, information
exchanges offer significant social benefits. 1 3 Generally, firms need
market price information to make intelligent output decisions, and
need competitor output and capacity plans to make intelligent decisions concerning their productive capacity." 4 Information ex115
change is necessary for the operation of an efficient market.
"Information is thus a two-edged sword: it is necessary if the competitive process is to work properly, but it can also facilitate
' 116
collusion.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

STIGLER,

supra note 6, at 44.

Id.
supra note 69, at 159.
Id.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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V.

A

MODEL OF EVOLUTION TOWARD COOPERATION

Assume, for the sake of simplicity, a non-stochastic duopoly
market-a market with constant demand and only two players (i =
1, 2)-playing in a game of infinite repetitions (t = 1, 2, 3, .. ., -0).
Further, assume vast information uncertainty: neither player has
access to any information with regard to market conditions or to
the other player. Each player has exclusive knowledge of its previous and present pricing as well as its previous and present profits,
but neither player has knowledge concerning the other player's
past, present, or future pricing decisions, the other player's cost
function, profits, or even knowledge that the other player exists.
Neither player knows whether he is the only player in the market,
whether there are two players in the market, or whether there are
numerous players in the market.
Each player strategizes as follows:
Where ait is Player i's action in period t, and Ai is the set of all of
Player i's actions,
ait E Ai

at is a function of Player i's payoff (profits) in round t-1, rrt-t, and
Player i's predetermined probability of increasing price one unit
(discussed further infra), 0Dj,
ai,t(Trri,

(A ), 117

and Player i's payoff in period t, rit, is a function of Player l's action in period t, a1 ,t, and Player 2's action in period t,

a 2,t,

T,t(ai,t, a2,d.
1) In any given period, t = 1, 2, .. ., 00, there is a probability, 0i,
that price will increase Aabove the price in period t-1:
P(a , = a4,-, + A)= 0i
2) Set price equal to a in period t = 1:
ai,1 =

a

3) In every period, t, set price, a4,, equal to the price in period
t-1, a4, 1, unless either:
a. Price is increased to a4 ,_1 + Aby the probability function,
(Pi.
117. Remember, neither player's actions are direct functions of the other player's
previous actions, since that information is unknown. The other player's actions will,
however, cause indirect reactions since each player's profits are functions of all players' actions; in turn, actions are functions of profits.
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b. Profits in period t-1, rr,, were less than profits in period
t-2, n4, 2, and t-3, i,_3.
I~tl < ITr,_2 and rrt_1 < rr~t_3
4) If 3b occurs, decrease price Abelow the price in period t-1:
If

TTt_n <

Trt-2

and TTt1_

< 1T4t_3---

=4 t-1
a

-

1.

5) In any given period, do not set price below a:
a4 , ! a.
For the sake of simplicity, the strategy described above fails to
calculate appropriate (real market) values of Oi, a, and A. The
model, nevertheless, suffices to indicate a possible tendency toward
cooperative equilibrium in the absence of any conscious commitment to coordinate pricing.
Consider an outcome that may result from such a game, in which
both players use the strategy described above, which I will refer to
as the Tester Strategy. Assume Pi = 1/5, a = 4, and A = 1. Further,
assume the jointly profit-maximizing price, P/., to be eight.
Player 1
Player 2

44445
44544

44454
45444

45444
44544

44445
44454

44445
44445

55556
56555

55655
65555

56555
55556

55565
55655

Player
Player
Player
Player

1
2
1
2

55556
55556
78777
77877

66676
67666
77778
77778

67666
66676
89888
88898

66766
66667
98888
89888

76666
66676
88988
88889

66667
66667
88898
88988

77778
87777
88889
88889

77787
78777
88988
88898

77877
77787
88898
88889

Player 1
Player 2

89888
88898

89888
88898

88898
88898

88898
88988

89888
98888

88988
98888

98888
88898

88889
88889

88988
89888

Player l's and Player 2's actions are respectively listed in the top
and bottom rows of each box. Player-actions are listed in groups of
five for clarity.
Each player sets price in t = 1 to a = 4 pursuant to rule two.
Since (Pi = 1/5, one of every five actions results in a price-increase
of A above the price in period t-1 pursuant to rule one. 118 In the
period after such increase, Player i will maintain the elevated price,
pursuant to rule three, unless profits during the elevated period
118. See the bimatrix above: Players both begin with a price of four. Each player
effects a price elevation (in this instance, to five) one in every five actions (since the
probability function, 0, is equal to one-fifth). In the example provided, both players
have equal probability functions. This, however, does not necessarily imply that they
elevate price simultaneously-just that the probability of elevating their respective
prices is equal. Thus, approximately once in every set of twenty-five actions the players' price elevations occur simultaneously. In the example provided, price is elevated
simultaneously from four to five in the twenty-fifth period. Similarly, twenty-five periods again pass before price is elevated simultaneously from five to six, and so on and

so forth.

2005]

A MODEL OF ABSTRACT COOPERATION

847

decrease below profits in each of the two preceding periods. Note
that Player i's price-elevation will cause profits to decrease below
those of the two preceding periods unless the other player matches
his elevation, in which case both players' profits will increase. 119
Additionally, notice that the players strategize to lower price
only if profits decrease below those of the two preceding periods,
rather than that of only the single preceding period. Otherwise the
players would engage in price wars every period after one player
"tested" the market by raising price for one period and then returned to the preceding price if profits did not increase.1 20 The disadvantage of such a strategy is that it may allow another player to
exploit the somewhat forgiving strategy by defecting only once in
succession. 121
The success of the Tester Strategy depends on the conditions by
which the market or game is defined. The game described above
provides a setting ripe for Tester Strategy success. First, the market
is defined as non-stochastic. Therefore, changes in profitability will
correlate relatively well with changes in a competitor's action. Sec119. Take, for example, Player l's first six actions. Player 1 begins by setting price
at four (pursuant to rule two) and continues pricing at four until its profits decrease
below its profits in the two preceding periods, or until the probability function takes
effect (pursuant to rule three). In none of the first four periods are profits lower than
they were in the two preceding periods. Therefore, Player 1 maintains a price of four
until the fifth period, when the probability function elevates the price to five. Now, in
period five, Player 1 profits less than it did in the two preceding periods (since Player
1 alone elevates its price in period five) and, therefore, lowers its price to four again in
period six (pursuant to rule four). If, however, both prices are elevated to five simultaneously, as in period twenty-five, neither firm's profits decrease below those of the
two preceding periods, and, therefore, both maintain the elevated price of five (again,
pursuant to rule three).
120. Assume, for example, a strategy in which a profit-decrease below only the
single preceding period triggers the return to a lower price, a4,-1 - I (as opposed to the
example described above where, in order to trigger a reduction in price, a profitdecrease below the two preceding periods is required). In period twenty-seven, where
Player 2 alone raises its price from five to six, Player l's profits increase while Player
2's profits decrease (since only Player 2 elevated its price). If Player l's strategy only
required profits to decrease below the single preceding period, Player 2's return to a
price of five (pursuant to rule four), in period twenty-eight, would trigger a decrease
in Player l's price from five to four, since its profits were higher in the single preceding period, where Player 2, alone, elevated price. If both players implemented such a
strategy, a price war would erupt and would continue until both players' pricing returned to a = 4 (the lowest possible price, pursuant to rule five). See AXELROD, supra
note 9, at 13.
121. Punishing defection may also be affected by the timing of the victim's priceelevation. The problem of such exploitation is to some extent alleviated by the conditions of vast uncertainty enumerated above. Conditions of greater certainty, however, may require further strategy elements that account for the possibility of such
exploitation.
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ond, the market is defined as a duopoly. Therefore, inappropriate
"punishments" and, thus, the number of periods required to
achieve "cooperation" are minimized.1 22 Third, the game is defined by infinite repetitions. Therefore, players have an indefinite
amount of time to establish a set of prices that maximizes profitability. Finally, the game is defined by vast information uncertainty. The Tester Strategy, which tests the market to elicit greater
profits and react to changes in profits accordingly, is prone to converge toward a profit-maximizing price if provided with the opportunity to do so (the other player's strategy is "cooperative"), but
will remain at a competitive price if not provided with the opportunity to raise prices (the other player's strategy is "uncooperative").
Use of the Tester Strategy by both players results in price-convergence toward the cooperative equilibrium. At equilibrium, both
players price at eight, the joint profit-maximizing price, but each
attempts to raise its price once in every five periods. A price increase above eight by one or both players will be maintained for
that period alone, and price will return to the cooperative equilibrium, eight, in period t + 1. If one player alone raises price above
eight, its profits will decrease as in any other period in which it
alone raised its price. Similarly, if both players simultaneously
raise prices, profits will decrease, since eight is the joint profit-maximizing price. In either case, the increase results in a return to the
price in period t-1, the cooperative equilibrium, pursuant to rule
four.
It is important to note that to achieve cooperative equilibrium it
is necessary neither that players have similar cost structures nor
that (Pi = 1/5, a = 4, or that I = 1. Such variables affect the equilib-

rium price as well as the number of periods required to reach such
however, affect whether cooperative
equilibrium. It does not,
1 23
equilibrium is reached.
In the case of DPi = 1/5, for example, prices are increased by both
players simultaneously, and thereby moved toward cooperative
equilibrium once in twenty-five periods, whereas if (Pi = 1/6, prices
122. I hesitate to use the term "punishment," since players are not reacting directly
to each other's actions. I use the term in order to maintain consistent usage of terminology. "Punishment" in this context simply refers to a decrease in one player's profits resulting from another player's price decrease below the established "cooperative"
price. Similarly, terms as "cooperation" and "cooperative," in the context of such a
model in which players do not directly observe each other's actions, refer to a state of
affairs in which both players have pricing structures such that each player's profits

increase as a result.
123. This assumes infinite repetitions and that Pi and A are greater than zero.
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would increase simultaneously, and thereby move toward cooperative equilibrium once in thirty-six periods. 124 Similarly, a greater A
moves prices toward cooperative equilibrium with greater speed.
Also note that at cooperative equilibrium players may maintain
different prices. This may occur, for example, if players have different cost structures.
VI.

LIMrrATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The model described above contains many simplifying conditions. Turner may be correct in arguing that real-world conditions
create complications for which emergence of "a pattern of noncompetitive pricing . . . requires something which we could, not
unreasonably, call a 'meeting of minds."' 125 The model described
is characterized by constant market demand and two market players. Such characterizations may not accurately simulate the vast
majority of real-world markets. Relaxation of the conditions assumed by the model indeed may neither destroy the results nor
invalidate its implications; it simply requires additional time to
achieve equilibrium. However, real-world conditions change rapidly, and the model's assumption of infinite discrete repetitions
may not adequately represent the time available in reality to reach
cooperative equilibrium. Further, the model is quite sensitive to
parameter modifications, and may call for computer simulations
rather than the artificial simulations applied.
Its limitations notwithstanding, this model is useful in that it provides a framework by which cooperation may be viewed as resulting from independent action that falls outside the ambit of the
Sherman Act's definition of "agreement."
Such a framework, however, does not necessarily imply that antitrust enforcement should be broadened or narrowed. A conclusion
that cooperation may result absent conscious coordination can, in
fact, be used as evidence for either argument.
It can be said that the effects of cooperation are equivalent regardless of whether players consciously coordinate such cooperation. It follows that the Sherman Act should, perhaps, extend its
reach to situations of cooperation even absent any conscious coordination. I, however, argue to the contrary: a rule that proscribes
pricing at cooperative equilibria even in the absence of any conscious coordination demands that firms act so irrationally by forc124. It is not necessary that 01 = 02.
125. WERDEN, supra note 6, at 772 (citing TURNER, supra note 3, at 664).
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ing them to deny themselves even independently profit-maximizing
conduct that full compliance would be impossible in a capitalistic
economy.
Capitalism is founded upon the principle that society's welfare is
maximized when individuals and firms maintain the opportunity to
maximize profitability. Of course, the right to maximize profits is
far from absolute. Antitrust law must balance society's interest in
maintaining markets in which firms are granted the opportunity to
maximize profits and in protecting consumers from the negative
effects of price-fixing. The Sherman Act wisely draws the line of
illegality at the point where independent profit-maximization becomes collusive profit-maximization-that is, at the point where individual firms "agree" to collude. The model described above
provides a framework in which defining "agreement" to include cooperation absent conscious coordination would force firms to ignore market conditions and profit-maximizing possibilities, and, as
behavior that full compliTurner noted, "demand such irrational
1 26
ance would be virtually impossible.
As noted, however, the model has limited applicability to realworld markets, and perhaps a "meeting of minds" is in fact necessary, in the real world, for achieving cooperation. The model is
nevertheless a reminder that such equilibria are theoretically possible absent conscious coordination. It is, therefore, dangerous to
stretch the definition of "agreement" beyond situations in which
such coordination is evident.
VH.

CONCLUSION

I proposed a model of evolution toward cooperation under conditions of vast uncertainty and in the absence of conscious price
coordination and information exchange. A non-stochastic repeated Prisoner's Dilemma model was used to show that certain
strategies may result in convergence toward cooperative equilibria
without any agreement, or even possibility of agreement among
the players. Rather, cooperation may evolve over time as a natural
consequence of independent profit-maximizing conduct. The possibility of such convergence suggests that it may be inappropriate
to extend the Sherman Act's definition of "agreement" beyond the
ambit of conscious coordination.
126.

TURNER,

supra note 3, at 669.

